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tions arising under these acts, which we shall state in this place,
as it was found impossible to bri~ig themt under any particular head
in the foregoing classification. May an instrument executed oil
Sunday be used in evidence, to establish an indebtedness, in acknowledgment of which such instrument was given? The ruling
in Lea v. Hopkins, 7 Barr 492, seems to indicate that it may be
so utilized. In this case, a bond void because executed on Sunday
was permitted to be used as an admission of a liability previously
existing; COULTER, J., observing that "a man may acknowledge
the truth on Sunday, and if he does, I do not know any rule that •
would prevent its being given in evidence against him." See also
-Rainey v. O7apps, 22 Ala. 288.
Another question is, concerning the effect which a subsequent
recognition of, or a promise to pay, a debt barred by the Statute of
Limitations, will have if made on the Sabbath. In Dennis v. Sharman, 31 Ga. G07, it was decided that a partial payment upon a
note will not take the case out of the statute, when made on Sunday;
and a subsequent promise to pay a debt thus barred, whether express
or implied, if made on that day, has been held in Bunigardnerv.
Taflor, 28 Ala. 587, to be insufficient to make of the debt a claim
upon which an action.may be brought.
J. II. LINm.
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KANE v. TIE IIIBERNIA INSURANCE COMPANY.
In an action on a policy of insurance against loss by fire, where the defence is
that the property insured was wilfully burned by the assured, the rule in civil, and
not in criminal cases, as to the quantum of proof, applies, and a charge to the
jury that the defendant is bound to establish the defence beyond a reasonable
doubt, and by the same measure of proof that would be necessary to convict the
plaintiff if he was on trial upon an indictment charging that offence, is erroneous.
TIhuriell v. Beaumont, 8 J. B. Aloore 612; 1 Bing. 339, disapproved.

Ox error to the Supreme Court. Kane brought an action of
assumpsit against the insurance company on two policies of insurance (not under seal), against loss by fire. The defence was that
the building insured was burned by design, with the knowledge
and procurement of the plaintiff.
The defendant's counsel asked the court to charge the jury that,
as to the defence of burning by design; while the burden of proof
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was on the defendant to establish this defence, it was only necessary
to do so by the fair weight or preponderance of the evidence. The
court refused so to charge, and charged the jury that in order to
make out such defence, the defendant was bound to establish the
same beyond a reasonable doubt, and by the same measure of testimony that would be necessary to convict the plaintiff if tried under
an indictment charging that offence.
The question of the correctness of this instruction was reserved
and heard before the Supreme Court: Kane v. HiberniaInsurance
Company, 9 Yroom 441. The decision of the Supreme Court being
adverse to the defendants, the case was removed by them to this
court, by writ of error, on exceptions sealed at the trial.
Joseph Coult and H. C. Pitney, for the plaintiff in error.
. Troorees and J C. Ten .Eyek, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DEPUE, J.-The writ of error brings up for review only the propriety of the judge's charge. It is conceded that there is a difference
between civil and criminal eases in respect to the degree or quantity
of evidence necessary to determine the verdict of a jury. In civil
cases it is the duty of the jury to find for the party in whose favor
the evidence preponderates; but in criminal cases, the accused
should not be convicted upon any preponderance of evidence, unless
it generates full belief of the fact, to the exclusion of all reasonable
doubt: 3 Greenl. 1Ev., sect. 29 ; Best on Ev., sect. 95. But it is
contended that there is an exception to this general rule, where the
issue in a civil case is one in which crime is imputed, and the guilt
or innocence of a party is directly or incidentally involved. In
such cases, it is said that the presumption of innocence is to have
as great effect as in criminal trials, and that to justify a verdict
against the party to whom crime is imputed, the evidence adduced
must be such as would be sufficient to convict upon an'indictment
for the crime imputed: 2 Greenl. Ev., §§ 408, 426; 1 Taylor on
Ev. 97 a.
This exception is most frequently invoked in actions of libel and
slander, where a justification imputing crime is pleaded, and actions
on fire policies, where the defence is that the property was wilfully
burned by the insured.
Actions of libel and slander on an issue upon such a justification,
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as civil actions, may be regarded as exceptional in character. A
defendant in such an action, if he was warranted in giving publicity
to the defamatory words by the occasion of publishing or uttering
them, may discharge himself if he shows by a preponderance of
evidence that the occasion was such as to make the communication
a privileged communication. But if he published or uttered the
defamatory words under other circumstances, in doing so he was a
mere volunteer, without any personal or private interest in the
subject-matter. In putting his justification on the ground of the
plaintiff's guilt of the accusation, he undertakes to prove the plaintiff's guilt, which comprises not only the doing of the act, but also
the intent which the law denounces as criminal. As a matter of
pleading, he is bound to plead with precision, a justification as broad
as the accusation attempted to be justified, and containing all the
ingredients necessary to the commission of the crime ; and as a
question of evidence, he is bound to make his proof co-extensive
with the averinents in his plea. Under such circumstances, it is
neither impolitic nor unreasonable to require the truth of the accusation to be established by the same degree of proof as is required
on the trial of an indictment. The mistake is in overlooking the
exceptional character of this class of actions, and deducing from
them a rule of evidence to be applied in other civil cases, for the
enforcement of contracts or the recovery of damages for injuries to
the person or property, where the presence of crime, if it appear in
the facts relied on to make a case or a defence, is wholly fortuitous.
The distinction between cases where the commission of crime is
directly in issue, and where it is only incidentally involved, is
recognised by Mr. Stephen in his excellent summary of the law of
evidence. In cases where crime is directly in issue, the author
states the rule to be, that the proof must be beyond a reasonable
doubt, whether the action be civil or criminal; but where the guilt
arises only incidentally in a case, he regards it as determining
merely the burden of proof: Stephen on Ev., art. 94, p. 115.
In an action on a contract of insurance, a defence that the loss
was caused by the wilful act of the assured, does not necessarily
involve a criminal accusation. It rests upon the legal maxim that
no man shall be permitted to derive advantage from his own wrong.
"It is," says Lord CAMPBELL, C. J., "a maxim of our insurance
law, and of the insurance laws of all commercial nations, that the
assured cannot seek indemnity for a loss produced by his own
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wrongful act: Thompson v. -Hopper,6 E. & 1B. 172, 196. In that
case, which was an action on a marine policy, a plea that the plaintiffs knowingly, wilfully and improperly sent the ship to sea at a
time when it was dangerous for her to go to sea in the state and
condition in which she then was, and wrongfully and improperly
caused and permitted the ship to be and remain on the high seas, near
to the shore, in the state and condition aforesaid, without a master
and without a proper crew to manage and navigate her, &c., and
that the ship, by reason of the premises, was wrecked, was held to
disclose a good defence. In delivering the judgment of the court,
Lord CAMPIBELL said, "according to the statement in this plea, the
plaintiffs' loss was caused by their wrongful act, and if so, I think
there was no necessity to characterize it as being either felonious
or fraudulent." Knowledge and wilfulness and a loss resulting
directly and immediately from such wrongful act, are the essential
elements of such a defence: Dudgeon v. Pembroke, Law Rep. 9
Q. B. 581 ; 1 Q. B. Div. 96; 2 App. Cas. 284; Thompson v.
Holer,E., B. & E. 1038.
Under a fire policy the assured may recover for a loss occasioned
by mere carelessness, without fraud or wilful misconduct. But to
make defence to the action, the defendants need not prove that the
plaintiff had committed an indictable offence. It is sufficient if it
be shown that the plaintiff purposely and wantonly set fire to the
property insured: Schmidt v. N. Y. U. 1. P. Ins. Co., 1 Gray
529. At common law, and independently of the Act of 1859
(Rev. p. 242), a man might burn his own house without incurring
liability to indictment, unless it was so situated with respect to the
houses of others as to endanger their safety: 2 East P1. 1027, § 7;
1034, § 11; State v. Fish, 3 Dutcher 323. After the Act of
1859 became a law, a man might still, without criminal responsibility, burn his own house, if it was done without intent to prejudice
the insurance thereon. Indeed, cases may arise where the assured
may procure the destruction by fire of his property, with intent to
defraud the insurer, and not be liable to indictment under the
statute. Criminal laws are essentially local in their operation, and
the incitement in a foreign jurisdiction to the commission of a crime
in this state, is not indictable under our laws. Therefore, one who,
in another state, procures another to eift6r this state and commit a
crime, is not guilty of any offence punishable by the laws of this
state: State v. ryeckoff, 2 Yroom 65. And yet it cannot be
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doubted that, before the Act of 1859, an insurance company might
successfully defend on the ground that the assured wilfully caused
the destruction of the property insured, anfl that such defeinee may
be made where the assured is'so circumstanced as not to be indictableunder the statute. A contract for indemnity in such case would
be absurd, and so far as it related to a voluntary and intended loss,
would be void in law: 1 Phillips's Ins., § 1046.
The doctrine that, in an action on a policy, the defence that the
plaintiff had wilfully set fire to the premises must be as fully and
satisfactorily proved as if the plaintiff were on trial on indictment,
originated in the case of Thurtell v. Beaumont, 8 J. B. Moore
612 ; 1 Bing. 339. This ruling is adopted by Mr. Greenleaf and
Mr. Taylor, and is strongly approved by the latter writer: 2 Greenl.
Ev., § 418; 1 Taylor's Ev. (5th ed.) 97, a. It is disapproved by
Mr. Wharton, and is vigorously assailed by Mr. May, the author
of May on Insurance, in an article in the American Law Review:
2 Whart. Ev., § 1246; 10 Am. Law Rev. 642.
The decision on this point in Thurtell v. Beaumont, was made
on an application for a rule and without much consideration. It
has never received approval in the English courts, although, as a
rule of evidence, occasions have repeatedly arisen for its adoption
and application. The cases decided upon the English Carriers'
Act (11 Geo. IV., and 1 Wil. IV., ch. 68), and the Bribery Act
(17 and 18 Vict., ch. 102), are cases in which a rule requiring the
same measure of proof in civil as in criminal cases, where the facts
in support of a civil liability would tend to establish a criminal
charge, would be expected to be applied, if any such rule existed.
The Carriers' Act relieves a carrier from responsibility for the
loss of or injury to goods in certain cases, unless the loss or injury
arose from the felonious acts of his servants. In several cases the
question has been before the English courts, whether the evidence
was sufficient to bring the case within this exception: C. V.
Railway Co. v. Rimell, 18 C. B. 575; Mletcalfe v. The L. & B.
" S. 0. Railroad Co., 4 0. B. (N. S.) 307 ; Vouggiton v. Tie' L.
, .N. W. Railroad Co., Law Rep. 9 Exch. 93; MC Queen v. r.
W. Railroad Co., Law Rep. 10 Q. B. 569. In none of these
cases was Titurtell v. Beaumont cited, or any reference made to
the necessity of establishing the issue by the weight of evidence
required in criminal cases. On the contrary, it is apparent, from
the observations of the judges, that the issue was treated of as one
VOL. XXVI.-38
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to be determined by the simple weight of evidence, as in other
civil cases.
By the Bribery Act (17 and 18 Vict., ch. 102), it was provided
that any person who, directly or indirectly, by himself, or any other
person, in his behalf, should give or promise any money, &c., to
any voter to induce him to vote, &c., should be guilty of a misdemeanor, and should also be liable to forfeit the sum of X100 to any
person 'who should sue for the same.
In Cooper v. Slade, reported in 6 E. & B. 447, and in 6 H. of
L. Cas. 746, the action .was for a penalty under this act. The
judge (Baron PARKE), at the trial charged the jury that if they
were satisfied upon the evidence, that the defendant did, by himself or any other person on his behalf, promise money to the voter
to induce him to vote, they ought to find for the plaintiff. This
direction was held by the House of Lords to be a right direction.
On the review, the case was discussed largely on the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain a verdict against the defendant. Thurtell
v. Beaumont was not cited, nor was the case considered by the
courts as if the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a criminal
accusation was at all involved. The only judge who adverted to
the rule of evidence as to the degree of proof necessary to the finding
of a verdict was Justice WILLES, in the House of Lords. He'asked
that he might be excused for referring to an authority "in support
of the elementary proposition that in civil cases the preponderance
of probability may constitute sufficient ground for a verdict, and
then cited at length a passage from Newis v. Lark, Plowd. 412,
and referred to Best on Ev. (2d ed.) 114. The passage cited from
Plowden is one in which certainty in pleading is 'contrasted with
sufficiency of proof, and it is said that "where the matter has gone
so far that the parties are at issue, * * * so that the jury is to
give a verdict one way or the other, then if the matter is doubtful,
they may find their verdict upon that which appears the most probable." The reference to Best is the paragraph (sect. 95) in which
the author adverts to the "strong and marked difference as to the
effect of evidence in civil and criminal proceedings," and states the
rule to be, that in civil cases a mere preponderance of probability
-due regard being had to the burden of proof-is a sufficient basis
of decision. These observations of the learned judge are entitled to
peculiar force, from the fact that they related to an action upon a
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statute which made the same acts from which a civil liability resulted,
also the ground of a conviction upon an indictment.
It may safely be said that Thurtell v. Beaumont. in principle,
stands alone and unsupported in the English courts, except in actions
of libel and slander, which are to be regarded as exceptional, and
resting upon considerations peculiar to the nature of the actions and
of the injuries for which they are brought.
In the courts of this country the principle adjudged in T7hurtell
v. Beaumont has received but slender support except in libel and
slander cases. The weight of authority is decidedly against the
soundness of the rule there propounded, in its application to actions
in policies of insurance, as well as other civil actions, where the
issue. is such that, for its support, a case must be made such as would
afford ground for an indictment.' In Gordon v.. Parmelee, 15
Gray 413, it was held that in an action on a promissory note, the
defence that the note was obtained by false and fraudulent representations might be sustained by a preponderance of evidence, as
in other civil cases, and that it was not incumbent on the defendant
to establish it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, although the
defence was based on a charge of fraudulent representations such as
might be the subject of a criminal prosecution. In Bradish v.
Bliss, 35 Vt. 326, the action was in trespass for burning the plaintiff's building, and the evidence showed that the defendant, if guilty
of trespass, had set fire to the building designedly, and was guilty
of the crime of arson. The court, nevertheless, huld that it being
a civil cause, the issue must be determined by the fair preponderance
of evidence. A similar decision was made in J1lunson v. Atwood,
30 Conn. 102, which was an action on a statute which gave the
right to recover the treble value of property feloniously taken. In
trover, where the evidence was such as to involve a'charge of larceny,
a direction to the jury that the evidence, to justify a verdict against
the defendant, must satisfy them of the truth of the charge beyond
a reasonable doubt, was held to be erroneous: Bisscl v. 71e'rt, 35
Ind. 54.
The decisions in actions on policies of insurance against loss by
fire, are mainly to the same effect. In Schmidt v. N. E U. 31
Fire Ins. Co., 1 Gray 529, the defence was that the plaintiff had
purposely set fire to the property insured, and burned it; and it
was held that the judge properly refused to instruct the jury that
they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, of the truth of
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this defcnce. The criticism on this case, in the court below, that
the instruction actually given was in substance equivalent to an
instruction that the defence must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the case, if it does not inferentially recognise the
rule in Thu rtell v. Beaumont, is of no value as an authority against
it, though warranted by some expressions of the judge, in his opinion
is shown to be untrue, in fact, by the opinion of the same judge, in
Gordon v. P~armelee, 15 Gray 418. In the latter case he adverts
to the case in 1 Gray, and declares it was not the purpose of the
court to sanction any exception to the rule, or to say that in any
civil action, the jury were not to decide by the preponderance of
the proofor the weight of the evidence; and he closes his opinion
by saying that, "in the opinion of the court, it is better that the
rule be uniform, leaving the instruction that the jury must be
satisfied of the guilt of the party beyond a reasonable doubt, to
apply solely to criminal cases." In the following cases, also, in
actions on fire policies, where the defence was a wilful destruction
by the assured of the property insured, the rule of evidence adopted
in Thurtell v. Beaumont was repudiated, and the correct .rule
declared to be that, in civil cases, the verdict should be determined
by the preponderance of the evidence, without regard to the fact
that in the defence was involved a charge which might be made the
ground of a criminal prosecution: Scott v. Home 1ns. Co., 1 Dillon
C. C. 105; Huchberger v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 4 Bissel C.
C. 265 ; Washington Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 7 Wis. 169 ; Blaeser v.
At
. ff. Ins. Co., 87 Id. 31 ; Rothschild v. Amer. Cent. Ins. Co.
62 Mo. 856 ; Atna Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 11 Bush 587 ; Hoffman
v. W. M. 4 F. Ins. Co., 1 La. Ann. 216; Whitnan v. Same, 8
Rob. 442.
I fully concur in these decisions, and the reasoning on which
they are founded.
In actions where usury was pleaded it has been said that the
defence must be established beyond a reasonable doubt : Conover v.
Van Mater, 3 C. E. Green 481 ; Tayhlor v. Morris, 7 Id. 606.
This language was used, perhaps inconsiderately, to express the
quantity of evidencethat, under the circumstances should be required
to defeat the plaintiff's security, without intending to assert that, as
a rule of law, the same measure of proof should be required in civil
as in criminal cases. So also in suits on fire policies, on a defencelike that in the present case, judges, in their instructions to juries,
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have commented on the gravity of the charge contained in such a
defence, and have put the presumption of innocence in the scales as
an clement to weigh in favor of the plaintiff and decide the issue,
if the evidence was not entirely satisfactory. The charge of Judge
DAVIS in Huclhhergcr v. Merchants' Fire Insuranee Co., and of
Judge DILLON in Scott v. Home Insurance Co., and of Chief Justice
WIIELPLEY in Powers v. M1arket Fire Insurance Co., in the Morris
Circuit, are examples of this mode of dealing with the subject in the
practical administration of the law. But in each of these cases the
judge was careful to instruct the jury that the rule of law in criminal
cases, with respect to the quantum of proof, was not to be applied.
A judge may make such comments on the evidence as he deems
proper, and may advise and instruct the jury with respect to the
degree of proof they should require to decide the issue under the
circumstances of the particular case. But a charge that, as a question of law, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required, is quite a
different thing. While it is impracticable to frame a satisfactory
definition of the expression "reasonable doubt," yet the effect of a
charge in this language, is a matter of almost every day's observation. Every one familiar with the administration of justice can
recall instances in which defendants, under such an instruction,
have been pronounced not guilty when the evidence of guilt was
quite convincing.
The importance of preserving the distinction between civil and
criminal cases increases with the growth of the criminal law. Alnost
every tortious act is by statute made indictable, if done wilfully or
maliciously, and the courts should be reluctant to adopt, in civil
cases the rules peculiar to criminal law, lest wrongdoers be enabled
to avoid civil liability, as well as escape criminal responsibility,
under cover of the rules of criminal prosecution, the object of which
is punishment only.
The judgment should be reversed.
DIXON, J.-Several of my brethren unite with me in desiring to
exclude the inference that we assent to the intimation contained
in the opinion just read, as to the exceptional character of actions
of libel and slander. We prefer that that matter should remain
open to be decided when its decision is necessary.
KNAPP, REED and DODD, JJ.,

DIxox.

concurred in the views of Justice
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For afrmance-None.

For reversal-THE CHANCELLOR, DALRIMPLE, DEPUE, DIXON,
KNAPP, REED, CLEMENT, DODD, LATHROP, LILLY, WALES-if.
I. The principal case is decided in accordance with the doctrine almost universally held in the United States. The
only states in which a defendant alleging
that the plaintiff wilfully burned, &e., is
required to prove his allegation beyond
a reasonable doubt, are Illinois (McConnel v. Deiatare Ins. Co., 18 Ill.
283), and Florida (SChultz v. Ins. Co.,
1 Ins. L. J. 495). On the other side
are the decisions in Vermont (Bradish
v. Bliss, 35 Vt. 326), Massachusetts
(Schmidt v. Ins. Co., I Gray 529), Wisconsin ( Washington Ins. Co. v. 'Wilson,
7 Wis. 169 ; Blaeser v. Ins. Co., 37 Id.
31), Kentucky (ins. Co. v. Johnson, 11
Bush 587), Missouri (Rothschild v. Ins.
Co., 62 Mo. 356), Louisiana (Hoffman
v. Ins. Co., I La. Ann. 216 ; Wightman
v. Ins. Co., 8 Rob. 442), and the United
States courts in the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits (Scott v. Ins. Co., I Dillon C.
C. 105 ; lucrhbergerv. Ins. Co., 4 Bissel
C. C. 265). In all these cases, except
Bradishv. Bliss, the point arose directly
upon a defences similar to that in the
principal case; and the court in some
few of them adverted to the fact that
crime was not necessarily charged
against the plaintiff, as no offence is
committed at common law by a man
who burns down his own house; and
the defence therefore amounts to no
more than a charg of fraud, such as
frequently is made in civil cases in
which a preponderance of evidence has
always been held sufficient to establish
the defence. Fraud is to be proved
like any other fact (Young v. Edwards,
72 Penna. St. 267).
In Indiana and Ohio the distinction is
drawn between an allegation involving
crime, and one where fraud is incidentally charged. In the former case the
facts must be proved beyond a reason-

able doubt, in the latter a preponderance
of testimony will be sufficient. See
Bissell v. Wert, 35 Ind. 54 ; Strader v.
Mullane., 17 Ohio St. 626. But in
Bradi v. Bliss, supra, plaintiff sued
defendant in trespass for coming on his
land and burning down his barn, which
amounted to a charge of arson ; and the
civil rule was held to apply. We may
add to these decisions the cases hereinafter cited, affirming the same rule in
civil suits in general, and especially in
actions for slander or libel, which will,
afortiori,apply to insurance cases.
II. In civil cases generally, except in
Indiana and Ohio, no distinction is
usually recognised between allegations
involving crime and .those where only
fraud is at issue. The current of authority is that in either case the allegation
may be made out by a preponderance
of testimony. Bradish v. Blisi has
already been cited. In Munson v. Atwood, 30 Conn. 102, an action under a
statute for treble damages for felonious
taking, the civil rulewas held to apply.
Gordon v. Parmelee, 15 Gray 413, was a
suit on a promissory note given as -a
consideration for land, the defence to
which was fraud by the plaintiff in stating
the quantity and quality of the land.
"We are not disposed," said DEw,,
J., "to extend the rule of the criminal
law to a case like the present, or indeed
to any civil case." To the same effect
see Young v. Edwards, supra; Crabtree
v. Reed, 50 III. 206, and especially
Knowles v. &,nbner,
57 Mo. 497, a case
to which we shall return, where the law
was carefully and ably discussed.
III. There is, however, a class of
cases, which, though brought in the civil
court and sounding in damages, are often
beld to be so analogous to criminal
prosecutions that the rules of evidence
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of the Quarter Sessions apply to them.
They are actions for libel or slander
where th defenlant justifies by alleging
the truth of the defamatory lublication.
The English rule in Chahliurs v. iN"ulakl,
6 C. & P. 478, has been adopted in
many of the states, and the defendant
held to prove'the allegation beyond.a
reaqonable doubt. It is so held in New
York (Hopkins v. Smith, 3 Barb. 599;
Woodbeck v. Kiler, 6 Cowen 118;
Clark v. Dibble, 16 Wend. 601), in
Pennsylvania (Steinman v. Mc Williams,
6 Barr 170; Commonwealth v. MfcClure,
3 Weekly Notes 58), in Connecticut,
Mix v. Woodward, 12 Conn. 262), Indiana (Tucker v. Call, 45 Ind. 31), Illinois (Darling v. Banks, 14 111. 46),
Mississippi (Coulter v. Stuart, 2 Yerger
225), Iowa (Fountain v. W~est, 23 Iowa
9 ; Ellis v. Lindley, 38 Id. 461). It is
to be noted that the majority of the court
in the principal case appear to take the
same view, while four judges signify
their dissent. The same doctrine is laid
down in Greenleaf on Evidence, vol. 2,
426, andl in Tay lor on Evidence, vol.
1, 5th ed., 97 a.
On the other side see Wharton on Evidence, vol. 2, 1246, and an able article
by Mr. May in 10 Am. Law Review
642, reviewing the American cases.
The civil rule is also laid down in
Kincade v. Bradshaw, 3 Hawks (N. C.)
63; Ellis v. Buzzell, 60 Me. 209; and
Briggs v. Cooper, reported in Bradishv.
Bliss, supra. Ellis v. Buzzdl was an
action for slender alleging adultery, with
justification, &c., and the preponderance
rule was held to apply. How far the
courts of such states as Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Kentucky (see Gordon
v. Parmelee,Munson v. Atwood; Ins. Co.
v. Johmon, supra), who have intimated
that they will not extend the rule of
criminal law to any civil proceeding,
will apply these dicta to the case of
slander or libel, remains to be seen;
but so far as regards decisions directly
on the point, it must still be said that

.()0.3

hy the weight of authority, on a justification by the defendant in ,ander or libel,
he must make out his cac beyond a
reasonable doubt.
IV. A question without whose discussion this note would not be complete
is raised in Bradish v. 1gi.% supra, where
the action amounted to a clhrge of
arson. The court below instructed the
jury that, though the doctrine of reasonable doubt did not apply, a fuller measure of proof was necessary than in a
suit involving no allegation of crime or
moral turpitude. It was held on appeal
that, while there was no intermediate
rule of evidence between civil mad criminal cases, yet. that "ie plaintiff assumed the burden of proving a fact where
the legal presumption was against him
that the fact did not exist ; and that the
plaintiff must not only overcome the
evidence of the defendant, by a fair balance in his favor, but also overcome this
legal presumption in favor of the defendant and against himself."
"Thelegal
presumption is that men' are not guilty
of fraud and dishonesty, and more
strongly, that they do not commit criminal offences. This presumption exists
no more when a man is on trial for a
criminal offence than at any other time,
or on the trial of a civil case, when an
attempt is made to show that a person
has committed a crime." The instruction thus interpreted was held unobjectionable.
Substantially the reverse of this was
held in Rothschild v. Jim. Co., ,npra,
where the judge below, being requested
to charge that a preponderance of evidence would establish a defence involving
plaintiff's wilful burning, &c., refused
so to do except with the qualification,
"regard being had, however, to the
serious naiure of the charge in determining the preponderance or weight of
evidence." This was held to be error
because it was "to inject into the case
an element of criminality which should
have been excluded from the jury. It
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was equivalent to saying to the jury, if
you find a verdict for the defendant on
this ground, you thereby establish a
serious charge against the plaintiff. It
was calculated to impress them with the
belief that greater caution should be
exercised by them, and proof of a more
conclusive nature should be required
than in ordinary civil cases. * * *
Besides the question of the intent of the
plaintiff in causing the burning was not
involved in this case." This last sentence is important, as tending to show
that, had the charge involved criminal
intent, the instruction might not have
been held erroneous. However this may
be, no other case has been discovered
where, on an allegation of crime or
great moral turpitude, such a charge
has been condemned by the tribunal of
review. Mr. Wharton (Evidence, sect.
1246, note 1), after laying down that
in all civil cases a preponderance of evidence will suffice, adds, "of course as a
factor in such a calculation is to be considered the presumption of innocence
attachable to good character, when
character is unassailed." DILLON, J.,
told the jury in Sceott v. Ins. Co., supra,
that the evidence taken together must
be such as clearly sat4fled them that
plaintiffs burned, &c. So in uachberger
T. Ins. Co., supra, the judge said, "as
this finding necessarily stamps the plaintiffs as dishonest, you should not be swift
to come to such a conclusion." See
also Lezington v. Ins. Co., 16 Ohio 324,
332. In Knowles v. Scribner, supra, a
bastardy case, after laying down the
civil rule of evidence as applicable, the
court added, "The amount og evidence
required must depend in a part measure
upon the character of the issue to be
tried. If there are no opposing presumptions, a mere preponderance of evidence, however slight, must necessarily
turn the scale. * * * But where there

is an opposing presumption, a mere preponderance of evidence is not sufficient.
The strength of the preponderating evidence must be in proportion to the
strength of the presumption to be overcome. Or, perhaps it is more accurate
to say that there is no preponderance
unless the evideitce is sufficient to overcome the opposing presumptions as well
as the opposing evidence. Thus the
proof must be stronger to support a
charge of wilful and malicious burning
than one of negligent, burning merely."
In Ellis v. Buzzdl, supra, the judge
said: "The burden of proving what he
has said to be true rests rightfully
enough upon the defendant, not. only
because he holds the affirmative according to the pleadings, but because of the
presumption of innocence. This presumption,les well as whatever testimony
the plaintiff may offer to repel the charge,
the defendant must be prepared to Overcome by evidence."
The question arises whether in the
converse case the refusal of the court
below to charge that there was a presumption of innocence of crime, or in
words of like effect, or the laying down
of the civil rule without more, would
be error. The only case discovered is
27tayer v. Boyle, 30 Me. 475, in which
it was held that an instruction to the
jury that "they should decide upon the
balance of testimony as in other civil
cases, and that the defendant was not
entitled to a verdict in his favor upon
merely raising a reasonable doubt," was
not so favorable as the defendant had a
right to require-the defendant being
virtually charged with arson. It would
seem, however, on general principles,
that the giving or withholding of such a
direction is within the broad and happily
undefined province of judicial discretion.
RICHtu S. HUNTER.
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Supreme Court of Illinois.
PITILIP F. SCANLAN

ET AL.

v. THO MAS COBB.

Where a purchase from an insane person is made and a conveyance obtained ingood faith, for a suflicient consideration, and without knowledge of the insanity,
the consideration must be returned before the conveyance will be avoided.
Where persons apparently of sound mind and not known by the adverse party
to be otherwise, enter into a contract which is fair and bona fide and which is executed and completed, and the property which is the subject of the contract cannot:
be restored so as to put the parties in statu quo, such contract cannot be set asidek
either by the alleged lunatic or those who represent him.
The fact of insanity must be clearly established in order to avoid a conveyance.
In suits respecting trust property brought either by or against the trustees, the
cestuis que trust, as well as the trustees, are necessary parties, and when the suit is
by or against the cestuis que trust the trustees. also are necessary parties.
APPEAL from Cook County. The appellee Cobb, acting as:
guardian of Mrs. Fannie Hendricks, by virtue of an order of the.
Probate Court of St. Louis, Mo., made October 24th 1874, adjudgingher insane and appointing him her guardian, filed his bill in thecourt below against Philip F. Scanlan and David B. Lyman, praying
for a decree setting aside a deed executed by his ward to Scanlan
on February 4th 1871, for a certain lot on Fourth avenue in
Chicago, and a deed of trust on the same property executed subsequently by Scanlan to Lyman, as trustee of one Aaron C. Goodman,.
and also requiring Scanlan to account for the rent of the property.
The ground upon which this relief was prayed wa that Mrs. Hendricks was insane when she executed the deed to Scanlan.
Scanlan and Lyman answered separately. Scanlan denied the
insanity charged and alleged that he was a purchaser in good faithfor full value, without any notice that it was claimed Mrs. Hendricks'
was insane. Lyman denied all knowledge of the alleged insanityof Mrs. Hendricks, and set up that Goodman in good faith loaned'
Scanlan $4000 on the security of the lot and accepted the deed of
trust upon the belief that the title was in Scanlan, as disclosed by the
records. The court on hearing the evidence decreed that the deed
of Scanlan and the deed of trust to Lyman be set aside; that Scanlan
account for the rent of the property, and directed the master in
chancery to state and report the account.
The master reported a balance due from Scanlan of $784.17, for
which a personal decree was rendered against him. The appeal was
prosecuted by Scanlan only.

Lyman & Jackson, for appellants.
VoL. XXVI.-39
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_3ontgomery 6 WTaterman, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHOLFIELD, J.-There are two grounds, at all events, upon which
in our opinion the decree should be reversed. 1st. The evidence is
clear that Scanlan had no personal knowledge that Mrs. Hendricks
was insane when he purchased and paid for the property. He negotiated with Van Wortaer, who was acting under a power of attorney,
ample in its terms and regular upon its face, and Van Wormer not only
failed to communicate to Scanlan that Mrs. Hendricks was insane, but
he persists that she was perfectly sane, both when she executed the
power of attorney to him and when she acknowledged the deed to
Scanlan, and for a long time subsequent thereto. The deed was
executed and acknowledged before Lucien B. Adams, a United
States commissioner at Springfield in this state, who many years
before had been acquainted with Mrs. Hendricks, and he was also
of opinion that she was perfectly sane at the time. it does not
:appear that Scanlai Lad ever had any personal acquaintance with
Mrs. Hendricks prior to his purchase, and the proof is uncontradieted that always before and for some months after she conveyed
to him, she was suffered by her friends to travel at her will, and do
as she pleased in every respect. The price paid for the property
may have been less than its actual worth, but if Van Wormer tells
the truth, it was the highest that he could then obtain for it. There
was an urgent necessity for immediate sale. It was encumbered
by a deed of trust securing a debt for $700, with accruing interest,
which was past due, and the creditor was refusing to extend the time
of payment. In addition to which there were claims due, which
were liens on* the property for taxes and special assessments,
amounting in the aggregate to $168.68. Reasonable effort was
made by advertising both in a daily newspaper and with a prominent
real estate dealer, to procure purchasers. Mrs. Hendricks neither
had money herself nor was able to procure any to relieve the property from liens otherwise than by its sale. We fail in the entire
evidence to discover sufficient grounds to question the good faith
of Scanlan in making the purchase. The court below, in directing
the account, excluded the consideration of payments made by Scanlan
other than those which constituted liens on the property at the time
of the purchase. In this there was error, Scanlan having acted in
good faith and without culpable negligence, is upon the clearest

SCANLAN v. COBB.

principles of justice and morality entitled, at all events, to be reimbur.ced that which he has paid, and which Mrs. Hendricks has had
the benefit of.
Courts of equity interfere to set aside conveyances made by insane
persons upon the ground of fraud, it being presumed that the lunatic, by reason of his or her condition has been overreached, and it
could not be tolerated that while protecting the lunatic against
fraud, they should aid him or her in committing fraud upon others.
There is no more reason in good morali why a lunatic should not
pay his or her debts lawfully contracted, or those which are clearly
and unquestionably contracted for the benefit of the lunatic, than
why a sane person should not, and it is equitable and right that a
person paying such debts for the lunatic, under an honest belief
that he was legally obligated so to do, although it turns out he was
mistaken as to the obligation resting upon him, should be re-imbursed. In l3farkins v. Lightnen, 18 Ill. 282, the decree was reversed solely upon the ground that the amount of purehase-money
paid to the lunatic was not allowed to the other party in stating
the account. And the English doctrine and that recognised generally by the courts in this country is, where a purchase from an
insane person is made and a conveyance obtained in good faith, for
a sufficient considdration, and without knowledge of the insanity,
the consideration must be returned before the conveyance will be
avoided. And the courts have gone further, and held that where
persons apparently of sound mind, and not known by the adverse
party to be otherwise, enter into a contract which is fair and bona
fide and which is executed and completed, and the property which
is the subject of the contract, cannot be restored so as to put the
parties in statu quo, such contraot cannot be set aside either by the
alleged lunatic or those who represent him: Eaton v. Eaton, 8
Vroom 108; Viel v. .3orley,9 Vesey 478; Moulton v. Camroux,
2 Exch. 487; Price v. Barrington, 7 Hare 391 ; Carrv. ffolida/,
5 Ired. Eq. 167; Sprague v. .Duell, 11 Paige 480; Loomis v.
Spencer, 2 Id. 153; Young v. Stevens, 48 N. H.-133; La Rue
v. Gillcyson, 4 Barr 375; Beale v. Lee, 10 Id. 56; L. C. N. Bank
v. M11oore, 78 Penna. St. 414.
The items of $28.93 and $22.50, paid by Scanlan to Wright &
Terrill, seem to have been honestly due to them from Mrs. Hendricks, and since they were paid upon her order to Wright & Terrill, without notice that she was insane, there can be no question
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they were paid in good faith, and they should be allowed. The
$2200, paid by Scanlan to Van Wormer on the deferred payments, seem also to have been paid in good faith; and Van Wormer testifies that he paid all that he received, and more, to Mrs.
Cobb, the wife of appellee, and sister of Mrs. Hendricks, for Mrs.
Hendricks. If Mrs. Hendricks received the benefit of this money
either in the payment of debts or in the furnishing of necessaries
for her use, there can be no question she should be held responsible
for it. But even if she did not receive the benefit of it, it would
seem, on the principle reaognised by the authorities 'above referred
to, her recourse should be on Van Wormer, and not on Scanlan.
2. The bill discloses, as well as the answer and proofs, that after
the execution of the deed by Mrs. Hendricks to Scanlan, Scanlan
executed a deed of trust on the property- to Lyman, as trustee, to
secure a loan of $4000 he had effected from Aaron C. Goodman,
on the faith of this security, and to whom he gave his promissory
note for the amount. Lyman had but the naked legal title, with
the duty to sell on default of payment of the amount secured by
his 'deed, when due, but the substantial equitable interest was in
Goodman. The rule in such cases as to parties is thus stated in
Story's Equity Pleadings, § 207. "The general rule in cases of this
sort is, that in suits respecting trust property, brought either by or
against the trustees, the cestuis que trust (or beneficiaries), as well
as the trustees, are necessary parties, and when the suit is by or
against the cestui8 que trust (or beneficiaries), the trustees also are
necessary parties. The trustees have the legal interest, and therefore they are necessary parties. The cestuis que trust (or beneficiaries) have the equitable and ultimate interest to be affected by
the decree, and therefore they are necessary parties." See also
1 Daniel's Ch. Pleading and Practice, Perkins's ed., 252. The
rule has some exceptions, unimportant, however, to the present
question.
Goodman was clearly a necessary party, and it was error to deprive him of his security, without giving him an opportunity to be
heard. We are by no means satisfied with the proof of the insanity of Mrs. Hendricks at the time she executed the deed to Scanlan.
Her three sisters, Mrs. Cobb, wife of appellee, Miss Georgia Mosely,
and Mrs. Fowler, as well as the husband of Mrs. Fowler, are quite
positive that she was .insane as early as 1868. Yet they acted until
some time after the execution of the deed, as if they believed she
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was sane. They made no efforts to have a conservator or guardian
appointed for her. They permitted her to go and come at pleasure,
and made no eflbrt to interfere with her control of her property.
There is no evidence that either of them, prior to her conveyance
to Scauilan (with the exception of irs. Cobb, and in this she is
contradicted), ever spoke of her to others as insane. Miss Mosely,
who discovered from her letters in 1868 that she was insane, and
who was afterwards frequently in peril of her life from her, as she
says, on the 4th of July 1869, wrote to Mrs. Hendricks's agents at
Chicago, Wright & Terrill, informing them of her recent arrival in
St. Louis, and of her serious sickness, but-then convalescence, requesting them to write to Mrs. Hendricks a full account of the situation of her business in their hands. In other words, requesting
them to correspond with, and communicate information to, a person
who was, by reason of her insanity, incapable of corresponding or
comprehending business matters.
Mr. Fowler, who discovered that she was wild, incoherent, unable
or disinclined to any labor, and had difficulty in preventing her from
drowning his child, wished her to stay with him as a housekeeper,
in consequence of his wife being in ill health.
Mrs. Fowler went with her to an attorney's office to consult with
them upon getting possession of the notes executed by Scanlan for
the property, and instead of warning them that she was insane, by
her presence and silence allowed them to believe Mrs. Hendricks,
as by her conversation she appeared to them to be, perfectly rational.
And Mrs. Cobb permitted her to leave her house for Chicago,
only going with her to the cars, with no one to watch or look after
her, and with no assurance of any proper person to receive her at
Chicago, with from one to two hundred dollars on her person.
Mrs. Hendricks entered the Uhlich Home at Springfield, Ill., in
1870 ; came there unattended, made her own arrangements for remaining there, and left there in the following April, of her own
accord, and unattended.
These circumstances are not absolutely incompatible, it is true,
with the testimony of these witnesses, that she was all the while incompetent to do any legal act, by reason of her insanity; but their
tendency is strongly to discredit the accuracy of their memories and
judgments.
There are several other witnesses who corroborate these witnesses,
however, in the opinion that Mrs. Hendricks was insane during -the
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winter of 1870-71, and afterwards. But none of them speak of
any test that could be regarded as conclusive as to the strength of
her mind in regard to business matters. They speak of her being
sometimes dull, sleepy, indolent, careless in her dress, and disgusting
and wanton in her attitudes ; that she was sometimes irritable and
wild in her manner, and incoherent in her speech, and had a strange
look in her eyes. Van Wormer and Adams testified that she talked
rationally about her business matters, and that when she executed
the power of attorney and the deed, in their opinion, she was sane
and competent to transact business. Wright & Terrill were her
agents for the care and renting of her property in Chicago, and
they had communicated with her by letter from 1866 until after the
property was conveyed to Scanlan, and they never discovered any
symptoms of mental derangement or weakness in her letters. Judge
Moody, of St. Louis, conversed with her after the execution of the
deed, probably in 1871, just before she became an inmate of the
House of the Good Shepherd, and he. thought she was perfectly
rational. Woodward and a brother of Scanlan had a lengthy conversation with her after she became an inmate of the House of the
Good Shepherd, and they discovered no symptoms of insanity.
Hale, the clergyman, and Dressen, the physician in charge of the
Uhlich Home, discovered nothing indicating insanity in her.
The attorney's office before alluded to as having been visited by
.her in company with her sister Mrs. Fowler, was that of McConnell
& Thornton, at Logansport, Indiana. The visit occurred on the
3d of May 1871, just three months lacking one day after she executed
the deed to Scanlan. McConnell testifies that he had never seen
or known of her before ; *that she communicated to him the detail
of the transaction to Scanlan, stated her business very lucidly and
clearly, and from -information communicated by her, from her
memory alone, he wrote to Van Wormer, who was also a stranger
to him, at his address 514 Pine street, St. Louis, Mo., giving the
numbers and amounts, and months when due, of the Scanlan notes,
*what they had been obtained for, saying that she had been informed
that he had turned them over to Mrs. Cobb, who had no authority
to receive them, and requestihg that he obtain them and send them
to her, and that she should hold him personally.accountable for the
notes.- He says her statements were as coherent and intelligent as
those of any person for whom he ever transacted business; and from
what he observed, her mind was in a perfectly healthy condition.
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It would seem the discrepancy between the witnesses might probably
be reconciled without serious difficulty, by bearing in mind the
undisputed faets as to the manner of life Mrs. Hendricks led prior
to 1869, and her unfortunate habits after that period. She was a
prostitute and had purchased the property in controversy in 1866
for the purpose of keeping a brothel upon it, which for a time she
did. Afterwards she caused the property to be rented, and went to
Montana, travelling with a cashier to some bank there as his mistress.
From Montana she went to California, and thence to some point on
the lower Mississippi. There is no pretence that her evil ways
were abandoned in California, and her letters show she was in
trouble with the police while on the lower Mississippi. Finally, in
June 1869, she was found by her sister, Mrs. Cobb, at the Planter's
House in St. Louis, very sick, and, as Mrs. Cobb says, insensible.
She had, not unnaturally, contracted in her disorderly life, the vice
of drunkenness, and the use of both stimulants and opiates in excess
clung to her until some time after the execution of the deed to
Scanlan, if indeed she has yet abandoned it. The Uhlich Home at
Springfield, of which she was an inmate when she executed the deed
to Scanlan, is a reformatory for fallen women, as is also the House
of the Good Shepherd, which she entered at St. Louis. Her
entrance, as we have before observed, of the Ulicb Home, was
voluntary; and although a watch was attempted to be kept upon
the movements of its inmates, there was no forcible restraint of their
liberty; and it is in proof that Mrs. Hendricks, while there, frequently visited a saloon near by, and was many times under the
influence of some degree of intoxication. To what extent she had
access to opiates is not clear. The fair presumption from all the
circumstances, however, is as frequently as to intoxicating liquors.
A mind demoralized by such a life, and stupefied by stimulants and
opiates, it would seem, would oftentimes appear to those unfamiliar
with the causes operating upon it, as crazed in the highest degree,
and yet when the effects of drunkenness would pass off, it might
possess, in a business point of view, more than ordinary acuteness
and intelligence. It seems to us most probable that what some of
the witnesses thought insanity, was in fact, but drunkenness or the
fits of nilancholy and despondency naturally following it, aggravated
perhaps by remorse arising from the recollection of a life of sin and
shame. This view will harmonize the statements of witnesses,
apparently equally honest and disinterested in the expressions of
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different recollections and opinions, while any other presents a couflict to be settled only by determining that some of the witnesses
have committed perjury.
The decree is reversed and the cause remanded.
To determine under what limitations
the deed of an alleged lunatic can be
avoided is of great importance in this
country where such implicit credit is
reposed in the good faith of record titles.
It has long been a mooted question
upon which respectable courts have
differed, whether the deed of one who is
insane at the time of the execution of it
is void absolutely, or merely voidable.
On the one side, Lord HOLT held that
all the acts in pais of a person non compos
are void, except his feoffment and livery
of seizin, and these are only voidable :
Thompson v. Leach, 3 Salk. 360. The
following authorities are also to the
effect that the deed of an insane person
is void, and may be avoided by the
grantor himsdlf: Estate of Desilver, 5
Rawle I lI; Rogers v. Walker, 6 Penna.
St. 371 ; Bensell v. Chancellor, 5 Whart.
371 ; Ball v. Mannin, 1 )ow. & Clark
380. So as to a power of attorney:
Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9.
On the other side, in Lord Coiv's
time, it was held that every deed ; feoffmeet or grant, which any man non
compos vientis makes, is avoidable, but
not by himself, but by his privies in
blood or representatives : Beverlys case,
2 Coke's Reports 568.
So Blackstone says: "Idiots and
persons of non sane memory, infants
and persons under duress are not totally
disabled either to convey or purchase,
but sub mode. For their conveyances
and purchases are voidable, but not
actually void: 2 Com. 291. So Chancellor KENT: "By the common law, a
deed made by a person non compos, is
voidable only and not void: 2 Kent
Com. 451.
This view has the current of authority
in its favor: Badger v. Phinney, 15

M1ass. 359 ; Tlait v. Maxwell, 5 Pick.
217 ; Allis v. Billings, 6 Met. 415 :
Arnold v. Biclhnond Iron lMorks, I Gray
437 ; Jackson v. Gunuer, 2 Cowen 552 ;
Ingraham v. Baldwin, 9 N. Y. 45 ; Claw
v. Baal of Baltimore, 14 Md. 299;
Crouse v. Ilolman, 19 Ind. 30; Somers
v. Pumphrey, 24 Id. 231 ; Parker v.
Davis, 8 Jones (N. C.) 460.
The grounds upon which such a deed
is held to be only voidable are : that
like the deed of an infant, it is susceptible of future ratification, which removes
it beyond the domain of a mere nullity ;
that the grantor who has been insane, to
avoid his own deed shall not be heard
to allege his own infirmity ; and because
no contract valid as to one party can be
held utterly void as to the other.
It has been suggested that the authorities could be harmonized by applying
the word voidable to fcoffments, and
livery of seizin, and the word void to
deeds. By the ancient law greater importance was given to a fcoffment than
to a deed on account of its solemnity in
the transmutation of a freehold. But
the feudal reasons no longer exist, and
livery of seizin has been abolished in this
country. It is believed that now a
deed made in proper form and duly
acknowledged, delivered and recorded,
is everywhere in this country equivalent to a feoffinent with livery of seizin.
And as by the coinmon law the fcoffment of a person non compos was always
held merely voidable, no reason is p6rceived why every deed of such persons
should nob now be placed upon this
ground. But however this may be, it
is certain no deed can be avoided where
the fact of the lunacy is left a matter of
doubt; which doctrine is one of the inferences to be drawn from the principal
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Such a condition of the mental faculties
must exist as would render the subject
incapable of acting rationally in the
ordinary affairs of life : Lilly v. Wag.qonr, 27 Ills. 396 ; Honey v. Chase, 52
Me. 305.
In the absence of imposition or undue
influence mere mental weakness will not
authorize the setting aside of an executed
contract, if there he remaining in the
grantor sufficient ability to comprehend
the meaning, design and effect of his
acts : Ahianv. tot,', 42 Penna. St. 114;
Gral am v. Pancoast, 30 Id. 89 ; Milb'r
v. (raig, 36 Ills. 109 ; Lindsey v.
Lindsj, 50 Id. 80. And the burden of
proving insanity lies upon the party
alleging it: Ja&kon v. T'n Dusen, 5
Johns. 154 ; GUraill v. Barr, 5 Penna.
St. 441 ; Attoroeey-Gencrul v. Parnther,
3 Brown's Chan. 443. But if such
insanity be once proved, or be admitted
to have existed at any particular period,
but a lucid interval be alleged to have
prevailed at the period particularly referred to, then the burden of proof
changes to the party alleging such lucid
interval, who must show sanity and
competence at the time the act was done :
Aftrncry-Gi ncral v. Parnther, supra;
I141l v. 11zrr(n, 9 Vesey Jr. 611; Whdte
v. WIil.son, 13 Id. 88 ; Hurden v. Hays,
9 Penna. St. 151 ; Emery v. Hoyt, 46
Ills. 258; Afenkins v. Ligltner, 18 Id.
282.
The principal case is especially im-

portant in that it emphatically announces
the doctrine that where a purchaser takes
a conveyance from a person apparently
sane in good faith, for value and without
notice, such conveyance cannot be set
aside by any person without his being
placed in li. former condition. Sich a
rule has its foundation in natural justice
as well as in reason and authority. It
preserves the'analogies of the law, by
placing a person laboring under the
disability of lunacy as to his conveyance
upon the same footing as a person making
a conveyance while under the disability
of infancy. And above all, it closes the
door to great frauds, which might easily
otherwise be perpetrated on the part of
those unscrupulous enough to take advantage of the lunacy, either real or pretended, of a relative, and make it the
occasion to wholly deprive an honest purcha-er of his title and of the consideration he paid for it.
In addition to the authorities given
in the opinion upon this point may be
cited, as sustaining the court, Sdbyv.
Jackson 6 Beav. 200; Sergeson v. Sealey, 2 Atkyns 412; Beavan v. McDonnell, 9 Exch. 309 ; 1 Dart on Vendors 6 ; 1 Story's Eq. Jur., 228.
The cases of Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray
279, and Iove v. Iobson, 53 Maine
451, are against the doctrine of the
principal case, but they do not represent the prevailing rule, either in this
country or in England.
C. H. W.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.'
E. J. EASON v. TIE STATE.
In criminal, as well as in civil cases, the bill of exceptions must be made up and
signed at the term at which the trial takes place, in order to secure certainty as to
the facts which occurred at the trial.
The responsibility of selecting jurors is impossd upon the court and the duty
I This opinion, for which we are indebted to
1873, but has not been reported.-Ev. Am. LAw
VoL.XXVI.-40

FREEMAN,
REG.

J., was delivered in
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thus imposed may be discharged either by designating the persons, and directing
the sheriff to summon them, or the court may direct the sheriff to summon a panel
and then adopt"the panel as jurors.
If the sgte summon a witness and refuse to introduce him on the trial, the court
cannot compel his introduction, as the law officer of the state is presumed to know
his duty, and can make out his case by any testimony he sees fit to introduce, and
if the defendant then introduce the-witness he is certainly not prejudiced, and cannot
assign the action of the state, in refusing to introduce the witness as error.
The finding by one jury in a murder case, of guilty with mitigating ci:cumstances," where the court disregards the finding, and sentences the prisoner to
death, does not bar a different jury in a subsequent trial fropa finding a verdict of
4"guilty" without mitigation.

THE defendant was convicted in the Criminal Court of Memphis
of the murder of one Ed. Iyles. The case was before this court at
a previous term, reversed and sent back for a new trial. The
prisoner was again convicted of murder in the first degree, the jury
making no recommendation for mercy to the court, as in the former
verdict.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FREEMAN, J.-Several questions are urged in behalf of the
prisoner at the bar for the reversal of the judgment. It appears
from the record that the prisoner was convicted in June, being the
May term of the court 1872, and regularly sentenced to be hung.
After motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial had been
made and overruled by the court, he prayed an appeal to this court
at the same term, which was granted; no bill of exceptions was
made up or tendered at this time, but the court adjourned on the
20th of July to meet on Friday, September 13th, for the purpose
of signing the minutes, the next term commencing the following
Monday. At the adjournment the prisoner's counsel announced
that they would take no appeal, and no bill of exceptions would be
presented.
The record shows that on the 13th of September, when the court
met to sign the minutes, a paper was presented to the court by the
defendant's counsel, setting forth some of the points in the paper
that was afterwards signed, and which appears in the record as a
bill of exceptions. The court remarked that he would not then sign
the paper, that the attorney-general was absent. If he were here,
and it could be agreed upon, the court would sign it. Upon the
return of the attorneyrgeneral he refused to sign said paper, for the
reasons stated in a previous part of the bill of exceptions-that is,
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that the paper was not presented for signature by the court until•
after the term had ended, as well as for other grounds not stated.
In fact the paper was not signed until the 17th of March 1873,
during the January term of the court, and then under objection by
the attorney-general. Under a well-settled rule, one based in the
soundrst reasons of public policy, this court has uniformly held in
civil cases, that a bill of exception must be made up and signed at
the term at which the trial takes place. This rule is necessary in
order to secure certainty as to the facts which occurred at the trial,
and ought not to be departed from; and we can see no reason why
the same reasons do not require it to be enforced in criminal as well
as civil cases. While announcing this as the rule for the action of
the inferior courts, one which we shall in the future insist on being
observed, inasmuch as this case involves the life of the prisoner,
and as far as we remember, the rule had never been applied in any
decision of this court to criminal cases, in tenderness to human life,
we will look into the papers in the record for this time and see
if there is anything in it that can avail the prisoner before us.
The first matter presented is, that on the trial of the case a special
jury of one hundred men was asked for by the defendant, whereupon the court ordered the sheriff to summon a 'special venire of one
hundred men, as asked for, at the same time giving to the sheriff
the names of one hundred citizens, and ordering the sheriff to
summon them as such venire, from which to select a jury to try
this case, to which the defendant objected. In the selection of the
jury from this number the defendant exhausted his thirty-five challenges, and asked for the thirty-sixth challenge, which was refused
by the court. Was this error? is the first question.
In the case of Cox v. Aunt, decided at the last term of this court,
it was settled, upon a full review of, the provisions of the code on
the subject, and as we think, on sound principles of public policy,
that "the responsibility is imposed upon the court in' the selection
of all the jurors, except' the regular force designated by the county,
court, and the duty thus imposed may be discharged, either.by designating persons and directing the sheriff to summon them, or he
may direct the sheriff to summon a posse and then adopt the panelas jurors." We see no cause to change this view of the question.
On the contrary we think it far better calculated to attain the result
which is the object of the law-a fair and impartial, and also upright
intelligent and unprejudiced jury to decide upon the rights of the
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people and of the prisoner, than to leave them to be selected by the
sheriff at his discretion. A court is less liable to be influenced by
considerations of feeling or of popular prejudice in this matter than a
sheriff, and is as competent to designate good and true men as is the
sheriff, who acts as its officer and agent. There is no error in this.
The next question presented is, that when the attorney-general
called his list of witnesses for the state he was asked by the counsel
of the prisoner whether he would examine one Frank P. Arnold, Jr.
He replied that he might or might not do so, but probably he had
better be sworn and put under the rule. Arnold, it seems, was the
only witness who was present and saw the homicide for which the
defendant was put on his trial. The state introduced all its evidence
in chief excepting said Arnold, and announced that the case was
closed, when the defendant asked the court to require the state to
introduce Arnold for cross-examination by the defendant, which was
refused by the court. It appears, however, that said witness was
then introduced and fully examined on the part of the defendant.
This has been urged with much earnestness for the reversal of this
case. We have presented in favor of the view of counsel for the
defendant, several cases cited--one of Hunt v. The Peolple, decided
by the Supreme Court of Michigan, in which an opinion is given
by Mr. Justice C.AMPBELL, that seems to maintain the principle as
contended for, but on careful reflection on the question we do not
approve the view thus taken.' We can see no reason why a court
should compel the state to make out its case by the introdcaction of
any particular witness, nor require that all the witnesses present at a
supposed criminal transaction should be put upon the witness stand.
If it be important to the proper defence of the defendant, he can
always have the witness in his favor, and even under our liberal
statute may have his deposition taken in the same manner as in
civil cases, on notice to the attorney-general (Code, § 5387), and
read in his favor on the trial. The real object of investigations in
court is to ascertain the truth of the case, in order that the judgment
of the law may be had on the facts.
It can make but little difference in the attainment of this end,
vhether the witness be called by the state or the defendant. If the
state shall fail to introduce a material witness who has knowledge
of the facts the defendant as we have said may always introduce
I We have been unable to find any report of this case by this name, but presume the reference is to Hurd v. The People, 25 Mich. 415.-ED. Axr. LAW REG.
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him, and thus get the facts known to him before the jury; and'if
he knew the facts that would make against the prisoner, the fiilure
of the state would work for his advantage by lessening the proof
against him. We feel satisfied that something should be left to the
sound discretion of the officers for the state in their responsible
position, and that they can be safely trusted with. the discretion as
to whether a witness should be put on the stand or not. We are
also well satisfied that in view of his official responsibility, no prosecuting officer without a substantial reason for it, is likely to withhold testimony that will tend to develop facts favorable to a conviction in a criminal prosecution; and we are equally well satisfied that
with the aid of counsel, either retained or appointed by the court,
no prisoner is likely to neglect introducing a witness who will be
able to develop facts favorable to his acquittal; and with the facilities furnished by our law for procuring the testimony of witnesses
in his behalf no one charged with crime is likely to suffer by the
adoption of the rule we have indicated.
As a matter of course, if there should appear that any advantage
had been taken of the prisoner by preventing his access to testimony
favorable to his case, or any trick or fraud whatever should appear
in the case, it would be the duty of the court promptly to compel
the production of any testimony thus withheld, and of this court'to
reverse on failure of the court below to do so. But nothing of the
kind appears in this case. On the contrary the.witness was introduced by the defendant, and thus he got the benefit of all he could
be made to depose in his favor. This would amount to a waiver
of the objection even if it had been well taken.
It is last insisted that insomuch as a former jury who had tried
the prisoner returned a verdict of "guilty with mitigating circumstances," the present jury were bound so to return, in the event they
found a verdict of guilty; and it is claimed the court erred in not
giving this instruction as requested.
We cannot assent "to this. The recommendation of the jury in
finding mitigating circumstances in the 'case is nbt a part of the
judgment or the law in the case, but is purely. a matter of discretion,
which they may exercise or not. Even when such finding is presented to the court, it is not binding, but may be disregarded, as it
was done by the court below in this case on the former trial.
We see no error in this refusal of the criminal judge. Reluctant
as we must always feel to take the life of a human being, yet after
a careful examination of this case we are compelled in obedience to
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the law, which we are sworn to enforce, to affirm the judgment of
the Criminal Court.
he prisoner be remanded to jail.
As to the last point in this case, it is
clear the defendant had no ground of exception, and for two reasons. In the
first place the words 11with mitigating
circumstances" formed no legal part of
the first verdict, and the verdict might
properly have been entered on the record
simply as "guilty ;" and, 2dly, if they
'did form part of the first verdict, such
verdict had been set aside-the whole
verdict and all the parts of it-at the defendant's request, leaving him in static
quo, as before the first trial. The addition of ", with mitigating circumstances"
is like recommendations to mercy, or
for commutation of sentence.
This question received great consideration in a recent interesting case in Massachusetts. Jesse Harding romeroy,
a boy fourteen years old, was convicted
of murder of a child four years old, on
the 22d of April 1874. The jury returned with their verdict of guilty, this
paper, signed by all the jurors: "The
jury recommend that the sentence be
commuted to imprisonment for life on
account of his youth."
A general verdict bf guilty was entered, and the defendant alleged exceptions to other
rulings at the trial, but not to this, which
on argument to the full court were subsequently overruled (I 17 MNass. 143) and
the defendant sentenced to death. Application-was then made to the governor
and council for a pardon. A certified
copy of the record of the conviction and
sentence was transmitted to the governor, and the original return of the jury,
given above, with another paper also
returned at the same time, giving the
grounds of the verdict.
'The justices of the court were then
inquired of by the governor and council
whether "I the papers so tran~nitted were
a part of the judicial proceedings in said
case, or of the record thereof, and what
is their legal relrtion thereto." To

which they unanimously answered: "A
memorandum of the ground of the verdict, or of a recommendation to mercy,
presented by the jury to the judges, cannot effect the manner of returning, recording or affirming the verdict, or the
form of the sentence; and in law forms
nfo part of the judicial proceedings in
the case, or the record thereof, and has
no legal relation to the judicial proceedings or record." See Opinion of
the Justices, 120 Mass. 600 (1876).
And it is not easy to see how any
other course could have been properly
taken by the chief justice who presided
at the jury trial, than Nas adopted by
him. The province of the jury is solely
to respond to the guilt or innocence of
the accused. Any addition thereto, unless authorized by statute, is clearly
extra-judicial. By the established practice in Massachusetts, which is believed
to correspond with the escablished form
of the common law, the jury are directed by the clerk when empanelling
them : "If he is guilty, you are to say
so; if he is not guilty, you are to say
so, and say no more." Anything more
that they may say, is therefore no part
of the judicial verdict of the jury, but
only the opinidn or sentiment of the
individual jurors or persons who compose thejury. In 7e 1'ark-Lane Murder
case, Ann. Reg. 1872, p. 209, the defendant was convicted of murder, but
"1strongly recommended to mercy, on
the ground that there was no premeditation in the act." But Baron CHANWZVLL
said: "It would be his duty to
send -the recommendation to mercy to
the proper quarter, lut at present all he
had to do was to pass upon her the sentence of the law," and she was sentenced to death in the usual form.
A similar course was taken in The
People v. Lee, 17 Calif. 76 (1860).
The defendant was convicted of murder
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in the first degree, with a recommendation to mercy. The court directed the
verlict to be entered without the recommendation, which on appeal was sustained, the court saying: "The recommendation was addressed solely to the
court, and constituted no part of the
verdict." See also State v. O'Brien, 22
La. Ann. 27 (1870) ; State v. Bradley,
6 Id. 560 (1851). So in The State v.
Ptter, 15 Kans. 303 (1875), the verdict as returned was "guilty of murder
in the second degree," and with it these
words, "and we recommend his punishment to be the least amount allowed by
law." The court declined to receive
the verdict in that form, and handed the
jury another blank, which was duly
signed and returned by them without
those words. This was held no error.

2, But if the words "with mitigaiing
circumstances" were a part of the firt
verdict, the defendanthad of his own motion procured that verdict to be set aside,
and therefore waived any benefit to be
derived from it. Indeed there are respectable authorities that if a defendant
on trial for murder is convicted only of
manslaughter, and the verdict is set
aside on his motipn, he is liable on the
second trial to be convicted of murder,
and cannot complain at such a result,
the consequence of his owne motion. See
United States v. Hardyg, 2 Wall. Jr.
127 ; Livingston's Case, 14 Gratt. 592 ;
State v. Stunton, 1 Ired. 424 ; State v.
Commissioners, Riley 273 ; Morrisv. 2lhe
&ate, 1 Blackf. 37 ; though this is not
universally agreed to.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.

Court of Chancery of Delaware.
CHANDLER v. HOLLINGSWORTH ET_ AL.'
A court of equity will protect a husband against a voluntary conveyance or settlement by his intended wife of all her estate, to the exclusion of the husband,
made pending an engagement of marriage, without his knowledge, even in the
absence of express misrepresentation or deceit, and whether the husband knew of
the existence of the property or not.
The wife's right of dower will be protected against the voluntary conveyance of
the husband made pending a marriage engagement under the same circumstances
in which the husband is relieved against an ante-nuptial settlement by the wife.
Such a conveyance is not wholly void, so as to admit the wife to a share of the
personal estate of te husband dying intestate or a child of the marriage to take
the real estate as heir at law or the personal estate as distributee. The conveyance is'valid to pass a title subject to the right of the wife in equity to her dower.
Distinction in this respect between a conveyance fraudulent in fact and one constructively fraudulent.

THIs was a bill to set aside a conveyance made in fraud of marriage. William Chandler, deceased, by deed executed three days
previous to his marriage with the complainant, Elizabeth Chandler,
conveyed all his estate, real and personal, upon certain trusts for
his own benefit during his lifetime, and after his death to be divided
I This case, though decided in 1867, and frequently referred to as a leading case
in Washburn on Real Property and other works, has never been published before.
ED. Ax. LLw REG.
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between his three sisters. The bill was filed, after Chandler's decease, by his widow, Elizabeth Chandler, and William Chandler, an
infant son, by his next friend, and charged that the conveyance was
made pending an engagement of marriage, without the knowledge
of the intended wife ; that it was a fraud on her marital rights and
void ; that it was void not only so far as to entitle Mrs. Chandler
in equity to dower of her husband's real estate, which but for the
deed she would have taken at law, but that it was absolutely void,
so that she was entitled to such share of his personal estate as but
for the deed she would have taken in the result which followed, viz. :
the death of William Chandler intestate; and further that a child
born of the marriage was let into the same rights which but for the
deed he would have held as heir at law of the real estate and distributee of the personal estate -in the event which happened, i. e.,
the intestacy of the father.
-E. C. Bradford and A. Higgins, for the complainants.
William S. kteCaulley, for the defendants.
.BATE S, Chancellor, after reviewing the evidence, expressed his
opinion upon the questions of law arising out of the case, as follows :. The case presented for relief is this-William Chandler three

days before his marriage with the complainant, Elizabeth Chandler,
while under an engagement of marriage with her made a voluntary
conveyance of all his estate, real and personal, thereby, if it be
allowed to operate, defeating the right of dower which otherwise
would have accrued from the marriage, and also withdrawing from
his own control the means he then had whereby provision might be
made for his intended wife and the issue of the marriage, either
through a will or by law in case of his dying intestate. This conveyance was made without notice to her, and as we must take it,
without her knowledge derived in any way whatever before the mar-,
riage. Yet no misrepresentation as to his means appears; nor any
positive deception as to what was done beyond simple non-disclosure.
Nor are we to consider it as an element in the case that Mrs.
Chandler before the engagement knew that Chandler had held this
property or that she had formed any expectations with regard to it.
We may now take'the legal questions presented by such a case.
Will a court of equity relieve against a voluntary conveyance by
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the husband of all his estate made pending an engagement; or, as
the English cases term it. pending a treaty of marriage made without
any disclosure to the intended wife or knowledge on her part, though
without any express misrepresentation or deception practised by
the husband? This is the general question; but it is io be considered in two forms :1. Will equity relieve, at least so far as to save to the wife her
dower in the real estate, even though the conveyance must stand,
as it affects the personal estate and also the real estate, except as.
this may be subject to dower?
2. Will equity go further and set aside the deed wholly, thereby
admitting to take effect the same consequences which would havefollowed if no such deed had been executed, so that as Chandler
in fact died intestate the whole property shall descend or be distributed as in ordinary cases of intestacy ?
Either form of relief will give Mrs. Chandler her dower. On
the latter depends her claim to a share of the personal estate, and
the claim on behalf of the infant complainant as heir at law and
•
distributee.
1. Let us consider the first question. The English -Court of
Chancery has, from the earliest times, protected the marital rights
of the husband against a fraudulent settlementtby the wife pending
a treaty of marriage. It is considered that he becomes a purchaser.
of the wife's property, in consideration of the charge he assumes
of her maintenance and the payment of her debts; that this is a,
right upon which fraud may be committed aiid vhich ought to beprotected. Lord THURLOW, in Strathmore v. Bowes, 1 Yes. Jr.
27.. This view has commanded universal consent from the beginning. But until a recent date the doubt has been as to what circumstances should be held to render the settlement fraudulent;
whether there must have been some inisrepresentation or deception
practised upon the husband, such as amounts to actualfraud, or
whether mere non-disclosure was sufficient as a fraud in law to invalidate the settlement; especially whether mere non-disclosure
should be fatal where the husband was at the time of the marriage
ignorant as well of his wife's having held the property as of its
having been disposed of away from him.
The first full examination of this subject was in Strathmore v.
Bowes, decided in 1789. That was a bill filed by Bowes, the husband, to set aside a settlement made before marriage by his wife,
VOL. XXVI.--41

322.

CHAIDLER r. IIOLLINGSWORTI.

the Countess of Strathmore. There was also a cross-bill filed by
the wife to set aside a deed revoking the settlement, on the ground
of duress by the husband in obtaining it from her. First, upon an
issue directed to inquire whether the deed of revocation was obtained by the duress, and a verdict so finding, that deed was set
aside: 2 Bro. C. C. 345. Then, the cause came to be heard upon
the bill to set aside the settlement, before Justice BULLER, sitting
for the Lord Chancellor. lie decreed in favor of Lady Strathmore. Upon a rehearing before Lord Chancellor TIInURLOW, the
decree was affirmed; and, finally, it was affirmed again on appeal
to the House of Lords. The argument before Justice DULLER
and his opinion are reported in 2 Cox 28. The rehearing before
the Lord Chancellor, with his opinion, are reported both in Cox
and in 1 Yes. Jr. 22. Upon the rehearing the arguments are
best reported in Vesey, but the opinion of Lord TnuTri.ow in Cox.
As a decision the case is of no importance upon the question before
us, since the settlement male by Lady Strathmore was not a fraud
upon the marital rights of her husband under any, the most liberal,
construction of fraud. It was made before she knew Bowes, her
future husband, even pending a treaty of marriage with another
man and with his consent: and her marriage to Bowes was itself
obtained by a gross fraud on his part. But the case is valuable as
containing a full review of all the prior decisions. Justice BULLER
considered that the decisions had gone only so far as to relieve the
husband in cases of some actual fraud practised upon him, and he
so lays- down the rule. The result, he says, is "that if the wife is
guilty of any fraud and holds out to the husband that there is nothing to interfere with his rights, then any deed executed by her in
prejudice of such representation shall be void." Bare concealment
he held not to be sufficient: 2 Cox 30. Lord TinuRtow, though
it did, not affect the result of that case, seems to have held to the
more liberal construction of frauds, which includes concealment as
well as positive misrepresentation. In his opinion (1 Yes. Jr. 28),
he says, "if a woman, during the course of a treaty of marriage
with her, makes without notice to the intended husband a conveyance of any part of her property I should set it aside, tlough good
prim2afacie, because affected with thatfraud." It is true, according to Justice BULLER'S view, that the early decisions were upon
cases of actual misrepresentation or deception, but it is also true
that the distinct question whether bare concealment was itself fraud
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had never before been raised; and, therefore, the cases prior to that
of Strathmor'e v. Biowcs are to be considered rather as presenting
examples of fraud, as they occurred ill fict, than as deciding in what
fraud on inariial rights must consist so as to limit the construction
of it. Lord 'l'IUItiiW must so have regarded them in laying down
his view of fraud in terms more comprehensive than Justice BuLLER
had done; embracing in his definition mere concealment, which Justice IW'LLMt had expressly excluded. The later decisions in England and America have sanctioned the view of Lord TIIURLOW.
The first of these is Goddard v. Snow, 1 Russ. 485, decided by
Lord GiFFoRD, Master of the Rolls, in 1826. In that case the wife
ten months before her marriage settled to her separate use for her
life, and subject to her appointment after her death, two sums of
money, 9001. in all, being not the whole of her estate. Her intended husband was ignorant both of her possession of the funds
and of the settlement made of them, and so continued until after
her death, when lie filed his bill to set aside the settlement as one
made in fraud of his marital rights. No actual misrepresentation
was alleged, nor deception other than was implied in the concealment. Here the precise question was presented, whether bare conceahnent was in itself a fraud. In the argument and decision of
this ease iStrathmore v. Bowes was fully reviewed and the opinions
of Justice BULLER and Lord TiiURLOW considered. Concealment
alone was held to be a fraud and the settlement was set aside.
Next, is a case in which the subject is considered by Lord
BROUGIA.31, though the decision went upon other grounds: St.
aeorg/e v. Maike, 1 Myl. & K. 610 (7 Eng. Ch. Rep.). Lord
BROVW11A raises the question and upon a review of the eases says
that in none except Goddard v. Snow had there been a positive
decision avoiding a settlement by the wife on the mere ground of
want of knowledge by the, husband. " Yet," he proceeds to say,
"it is certain that all the cases in which the subject is -approached
treat the principle as one of undoubted acceptance in this court;
and it must be heb to be the rule of the court, to he gathered from
a uniform current of dicta though resting upon a very slender foundation of actual decision touching the simple point." This was in
1833.
In England v. Downs, 2 I3eav. 322 (27 Eng. Ch. Rep.) 1840,
in which the question concerned the validity of a settlement made
by a widow upon children of a former marriage before a second
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marriage, the Master of the Rolls, Lord LANGDALE, considered it
not sufficiently proved that the settlement was made pending a
treaty of marriage; or, if so, that it was concealed 7q to the tine
of the marriage; and on these grounds he sustained the settlement;
but he states the law quite fully on the point before us, and clearly
in accordance with Goddard v. Snow, that mere concealment is
sufficient to avoid an ante-nuptial settlement by the wife. He
adds a qualification, not necessary to be here considered, viz., that
the concealment is evidence of fraud rather than fraud per se, and
therefore is open to explanation, so that cases may occur in which
non-communication would not be held fraudulent.
Next is Taylor v. Pugh, 1 Hare 608 (23 Eng. Ch. Rep.) 1842.
In this case a settlement made before marriage to the exclusion of
the husband was sustained on the special ground tbat the husband
had previously seduced the woman, thus putting her in a situation
in which she must submit to a marriage without being able to stipulate for a settlement out of her own property. In his opinion the
Vice-Chancellor, SIR JAMES WIGRAM, notices with strong disap-

proval the argument that to avoid such an ante-nuptial settlement
by a wife without the intended husband's knowledge actual fraud or
deception must be proved; and he cites as the true rule a statement
from 2 Roper on Husband and Wife 162, that "deception will be
inferred if after the commencement of the treaty for marriage the
wife should attempt to make any disposition of her property without
her intended husband's knowledge or concurrence."
It is true that the cases cited subsequent to that of Goddard v.
Snow, give only the dicta of judges in support of the rule of that
case; but they show, at least, a concurrent judicial opinion, from
that case down, in favor of the rule which holds mere concealment
to be at least evidence of fraud. The real doubt has been whether
the concealment should in all cases per se avoid the settlement, or
whether a settlement not disclosed to the husband might, nevertheless, be sustained upon such equitable considerations, as the meritorious character of the objects provided for, such as children of a
former marriage: .unt v. Matthews, 1 Vern.408; .Kingv. Cotton,
2 P. Wins. 675: so the poverty of the husband and his inability
to make any settlement upon his wife: King v. Cotton, supra;
St. George v. Wake, 1 Myl. & K. 610 (7 Eng. Ch. Rep.); so
the fact that the settlement is of part only of the wife's property,
which was the ground in Demandevillev. Crompton, 1 V. & B. 852.
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The only equitable consideration relied upon in the pending case
was that Mrs. Chandler, as we must assume, had no knowledge that
William Chandler had held the property in controversy; and hence,
the expectation of it could not have been an inducement to the
marriage. But this circumstance is certainly immaterial. The
true ground of relief is not the disappointment of- an expectation,
but'fraud upon a l'gal right, that is, the right to a marriage without any secret alteration of the circumstances of the parties as they
stood at the time of the engagement. The husband's ignorance of
the property settled, though urged in Goddardv. Snow and Taylor
v. Pugh, as a ground for sustaining the settlement, was expressly
overruled and was disapproved in England v. Downs. In the latter
case Lord LANGDALE says: " If both the property and the mode
of its conveyance pending the marriage treaty were concealed from
the intended husband, as was the case in Goddard v. Snow, there
is still a fraud practised on the husband. The non-acquisition of
property of which he had no notice is no disappointment; but still
his legal right to property actually existing is defeated, and the
vesting and continuance of a separate power in his wife over property which ought to have been his, and which is without his consent
made independent of his control, is a surprise upon him and might
if previously known have induced him to abstain from the marriage."
In Taylor v. Pugh, the same consideration was rejected by the
vice-chancellor; and he reasoned with great force, that no equitable
considerations arising out of the circumstances of the particular
case, such as those before referred to, shall excuse a concealment
from the husband or sustain a settlement made without his knowledge.
In this country the ignorance of the husband of a settlement by
the wife pending a treaty of marriage has of itself been uniformly
held fatal to the settlement, though no actual misrepresentation or
deceit might appear. The cases are collected in 1 White & Tudor's
Leading Cases 317. See especially Linker v. Smith, 4 Wash. 0.
C. 224; Tucker v. Andrews, 13 Mfe. 124; Logan v. Simmons, 3
Ired. Eq. 487; Sencer v. Spencer, 3 Jones Eq. 404, 409;
Poston v. Gillespie, 5 Id. 253; 1?amsay v. Joyce, 1 MceMullan
Eq. 236 (in which latter case an issue was directed to the
single question whether the husband had knowledge of the settlement); and Manes v. Durant, 2 Rich. Eq. 403. In North
and South Carolina the whole subject of fraud on marital rights has
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been examined in a series of cases contemporineous with the later
English decisions and without reference to them, but reaching the
same conclusion, viz., that no ante-nuptial settlement by the wife
-can be valid if made without the husband's knowledge; it matters
not how meritorious may be the objects provided for by the wife,
or what may be the circumstances of the husband. le is considered
as having rights springing out of the treaty of marriage, not to be
controlled by any equitable considerations between the wife and
third persons. And in North Carolina the result reached by frequent investigations of the subject has been to establish a1rule
requiring in order to sustain a settlement by the wife, not only that
the husband have general knowledge of her intention to make one
or that she has done so, but requiring his consent to the very act
or instrument by which the settlement is made: SpJencer v. S"ecvwer,
8 Jones Eq. 409; -Postonv. Gillespie, 5 Id. 262.
We see then that both in England and in this country since the
decision of Strath~more v. Bowes, and the cases prior to it, the course
of judicial opinion has tended more and more to strengthen the
protection of marital rights against settlements made to their prejudice; (1st) by enlarging the ground of invalidity. rhis originally
was only actual fraud, evidenced by positive misrepresentation or
deceit; but now it includes also constructive fraud, such as arises
from mere non-disclosure; and (2d) by excluding all the exceptions
founded on equitable considerations in the particular case, which
were originally allowed to support such settlements; thus making
in all cases the husband's knowledge at least, and in some courts
his positive assent essential to the validity of a conveyance or settlement made after an engagement to marry.
Now, wishing to lay down a rule only for the case presented, it
is enough to say that this court will protect a husband against a
voluntary conveyance or settlement by the wife of all her estate,
to the exclusion of the husband, made pending an engagement of
marriage, without his knowledge prior to the marriage, even in the
absence of express misrepresentation or deceit, and whether the
husband knew of the existence of the property or not. The concealment of what it is the right of the husband to know, and what
it is the duty of the wife to disclose, is itself fraud in law. It is a
doctrine of equity, not so fully developed at the date of Strathtmore
v. Bowes as now, that the concealment, to the prejudice of another
party with whom one is dealing, of facts which if known to him
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might affect hi: decision and which there is an obligation arising
out ,a the trainsaction to disclose, is a fraud. It is so treated in
equity without respect to the motive of the party in the concealment,
being what is termed an constructive fraud. But, whether a conveyance or ,ettlement made under the circumstances I have stated
is alwag.v void, or whether it may be sustained upon such equitable
considerations as were admitted in the earlier English cases, and in
GSet.-yeoq
v. Waeke, 1 Myl. & K. 610, such as the reasonableness
of its provisions as being made for children of a former marriage,
or its embracing only a part of the wife's estate, or such as the husband's inability to make a settlement upon the wife, I leave as
questions open in this state until they arise judicially.
We now reach a question which was discussed with much earnestness and ability on both sides. Will equity extend to the wife
the like protection against an ante-nuptial conveyance by her husband which we have seen it affords to the husband against her ?
After a patient examination of the argument and authorities I
find no just ground of discrimination against the wife. First, dower
is a riglit ,f prop,.rty, and as such a proper subject of protection:
indeed, a right above all other rights of property favored. Again,
dower is a marital right, as well as is the husband's interest in the
wife's property. Protection, maintenance and dower are the rights
enuring to her from the marriage ; and though her dower is inchoate only until the husband's death, it is none the less in his lifetime
a legal right, vested and indefeasible except by her own act. This
is so far recognised that a release of it by the wife is held a sufficient conzileration to support a post-nuptial settlement upon her,
and to make it available, if bonafide, against the husband's creditors:
Atherley on
ar. Sett. (27 Law Lib.) 162; Bullard v. Briggs,
7 Pick. 533. Again, the wife is a yurehaserof hbr marital rights:
as much so -.s is the husband. She takes them for a consideration,
rendered by her in the marriage, a consideration not indeed the
same in kind as that rendered by the husband for his marital rights;
but, considering all the consequences involved in marriage, what
the wife surrenders is in value or measure more, certainly not less,
than what she receives. She surrenders her person, her services,
her self-control, her means of self-support ; and as to property, far
more than the interest she acquires. However, it should be said,
that whether the wife's dower, as well as the husband's interest in
her estate, is to be protected against fraud, depends not at all upon
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such considerations as the comparative value of the consideration
rendered by each, or the value of their respective rights, but solely
upon the fact that there exists a marital 2'ight, which in common
with all legal rights is a proper subject of legal protection, whether
it be itself of more or less value, or whether it spring from a larger
or less consideration rendered. If there could be any ground, in
addition to the mere existence of a right defrauded, to evoke 8,
swifter interposition for one sex rather than for the other, it would
be the consideration that the wife, being of the weaker sex, the
more needs legal protection.
It was argued by the defendants' counsel that in England dower
is not protected as a marital right against a conveyance by the husband before the marriage, even though made on the eve of marriage
and expressly to exclude the wife; that under the English decisions
the husband and wife, in this respect, stand on a different footing.
There is no decision upon the precise question; but the weight of
opinion is in favor of the position taken. Prior to the Statute of
Uses, estates were largely held in trust; and it was from the beginning considered that dower did not attach to a use, even when it
was one reserved to the husband under a conveyance made by himself. Whether a conveyance with a use reserved to himself by the
husband, made on the eve of marriage and with the express purpose of barring dower, was at that period held to be effectual does
not appear by any decided case. The case E parte Bell, 1 Glyn
& J. 282, cited in 1 Roper on Hus. and Wife (82 Law Lib.) 854 n.,
that a voluntary settlement made by the husband, though set aside
as fraudulent against creditors, prevents his wife's right of dower,
cannot be taken as a decision upon the question, since it does not
appear whether the setlement was made pending a marriage treaty.
'
The dicta on this point are conflicting. Lord Chief Baron GILBERT'is reported to have said that such a conveyance would be
fraudulent as to the wife: 4 Cruise's Dig. 416; 1 Roper on Husband
and Wife (82 Law Lib.) 854 n. In 1 Cruise 411 and in 4 Cruise
416, it is laid down that a secret conveyance by the husband in
'trust before marriage to defeat dower is void; and the whole doctrine as to ante-nuptial settlements by the wife is expressly applied
to conveyances by the husband made under like circumstances.
On the other band, Lord HARDWICKE, in Wannock v. _bfford, Co.
Litt. 208 a, note 1, also reported fully in Park on Dower 882,
treats it as admitted, "that if a man before marriage conveys his
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estate privately, without the knowledge of his wife, to trustees in
trust for himself and his heirs in fee, that will prevent dower."
Upon this authority Park on Dower 236 so lays down the rule.
So also does 1 Washburn on Real Prop. 161. After the Statute
of Uses, which converted all uses into legal estates and so admitted
dower to attach to them, another mode of avoiding the inconveniences.
of dower was resorted to by the practice of settling jointures in lieu
of dower. By a statute of Henry VIII., which was passed to
remedy the inconvenient effect of the Statute of Uses as to dower,
the husband was authorized to settle upon his intended wife, before
the marriage, a jointure, which if reasonable, was held effectual as
an equivalent for dower and barred it, even though made -without
the wife's privity, the courts of equity reserving the power to relieve the wife against a jointure unfair or merely illusory. Such,
after much controversy, was the construction finally given to this
statute in Dury v. Dury, 3 Bro. Parl. Cas. 492, cited in 1 Roper
477. The effect was that dower under the English system became
a precarious, and in the case of large estates, an infrequent mode
of provision for the wife; and; hence, its value as a marital right
and the importance of protecting itrwas the less appreciated. Marriage was not presumed to have been contracted in expectation of
it, unless upon representations to the wife that she would become
entitled to it. This may account for what otherwise must appear
as an unjust discrimination made by the English courts of equity
in withholding from the wife such protection as is given to the husband against secret ante-nuptial settlements. Such a reason is suggested in the note to 1 Roper 354. But, in this country clearlythe same reasons do not apply. Her dower is the only provisionmade by law for the wife out of the husband's real estate. Prac-tically it is a most important resource, and the only form of provision out of real estate enjoyed by her except under wills. It
does in fact to a large extent enter into the wife's expectations in
contracting marriage, and properly so. It, therefore, ought to
receive all the protection accorded to any marital right; to refuse
it would, in this country, where jointures are unknown, render the
right of dower precarious, if not wholly illusory.
In none of the American cases has this subject been thoroughly
examined; but so far as they have gone they treat the wife's marital
rights and their claim to protection as being on the same footing
with those of the husband. In Su'aine v. Perine, 5 Johns. Ch.
VOL. XXVI.-42
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482, a conveyance was made by a husband before marriage with a
view to defeat the wife's dower; the deed was to his daughter, was
kept concealed for many years and possession did not go with it.
After the husband's death the widow filed her bill for dower, and
it was decreed to her, the deed being adjudged fraudulent as against
her. It is true, that in a previous suit the deed had been held void
as against a mortgagee claiming under a mortgage subsequent in
date to the deed; but the widow was admitted to her dower not at
all in consequence of the decree previously made that the deed was
void as against the mortgagee. It was expressly declared to be
fraudulent as against her also; and she would have been relieved
quite as certainly had there been no previous controversy between
the husband's representatives and another party touching the deed.
It is also true that this was treated by the chancellor as a case of
fraud in fact. It is then an authority for the relief of the wife
against an ante-nuptial conveyance by the husband fraudulent in
fact; but whether she should be relieved against a conveyance on
the ground of mere non-disclosure is a question not decided in
Swaine v. Perine.
To the same extent precisely is the ruling of Petty v. Petty, 4
B. Mon. 215. In that case a settlement by the husband on the
eve of marriage, of all his property upon his children by a former
marriage,'was declared void so far as it affected the wife's dower in
the real estate. It was a case of fraud in fact very gross in its
circumstances, being in violation of express representations made to
the wife before marriage in order to induce her consent. This case,
like Swaine v. Perine,decides nothing as to the effect of mere concealment. It is, however, in one of its features a valuable recognition of the meritorious character of dower as a marital right, and
of its claim to legal protection; for the wife was relieved upon a
bill filed in her htusband's lifetime, while her dower was inchoate
only, the deed being adjudged void lest it should through delay
become an impediment to her right of dower in the event of her
surviving the husband.
Now, although in Swaine v. Perine, and Petty v. Petty, relief
was given against fraud in fact, yet in weighing the effect of these
decisions upon the case before us this is to be considered. They
recognize the wife's dower to be a marital right, and as such a
proper subject of protection in equity against a fraudulent antenuptial conveyance; placing it upon an equal footing in this respect
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with the husband's marital rights. Then, with respect to the sort
of' t'risil against which she should be relieved: whether it must be
uni*v what is termed fraud in ffact, or whether she should be protected against constructive fraud, such as bare concealment, the
same rule must apply in her favor which we have already seen
has become settled for the husband's protection, viz., that construetive as well as actual fraud will invalidate an ante-nuptial conveyance.
Two cases at least have carried the protection of the'wife thus
far; one is Cranson v. Cranson, 4 Mich. 230. A husband, two
weeks before his narriage, made a voluntary conveyance of his lands
to his sons, with the design to exclude his intended wife. There
was no misrepresentation to the wife, no positive deception ; it was
a case of mere coneahment. The deed was held void on two distinct grounds, viz., the absence of a sufficient delivery, and also that
"being executed secretly, for the purpose of cutting off the wife's
dower, it was a fraud in law upon her rights accrued directly from
the marriage." The other case of this class is Smith v. Simith, 2
IHalst. Ch. Rep. 515. A husband, on the day of the marriage, but
before it, without the wife's knowledge, settled property upon himself and a daughter by a former marriage, with intent to defeat
dower. Actual misrepresentation was alleged by the bill, but denied
by the answer; no proof to that effect appears; and the decision
does not rest upon any such feature; but the chancellor assumes
the broad ground that "a voluntary conveyance by a man on the
eve of marriage, unknown to the intended wife, and made for the
purpose of defeating the interest which she would acquire by the
marriage in his estate, is fraudulent as against her. I see no sound
distinction (he adds) between this case and the like conveyance by
a woman under the like circumstances."
In 1 Scribner on Dower 561, there are cited to the same point
Littleton v. Littleton, 1 Dev. & Bat. 327, and -Rowlandv. Rowland,
2 Sneed 543; but these cases I have not seen. Scribner refers to
the American decisions as "not being entirely uniform ;" and in 1
Washburn on Real Property 175, it is said that "the cases are
singularly conflicting." On examination of the casej I find no
conflict whatever as to the power of a court of equity to relieve the
wife. It is only in courts of law where a legal seisin is essential
to dower that the claim to it against the husband's conveyance prior
to marriage has been denied, as in Baker v. Chase, 6 Hill 482.
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The other case .cited in Washburn as against the doctrine of
Swaine v. Perine is Jenny v. Jenny, 24 Vt. 824. I have examined
this case and think it not relevant to the question, though not having
it by me I cannot state its circumstances. The rule to be derived
from the equity decisions is that the wife's dower will be protected
against the voluntary conveyance of the husband made pending a
marriage engagement, under precisely the same circumstances in
which the husband is relieved against an ante-nuptial settlement
by the wife.
I am, therefore, of opinion that Mrs. Chandler is entitled to
dower out of the real estate described in the deed of trust, notwithstanding the execution of the deed before her marriage, together
with one-third of the rents and profits accrued since her husband's
death. It appears from the answer that part of the real estate, a
lot in Wilmington, has been sold by the trustee for $400, its value.
Assuming, as it is proper to do, that the purchaser was a bona
fide purchaser, without notice, the court will not follow this lot into
his hands; but the widow is nevertheless entitled as against the
defendants to an assignment of such a share of the remaining real
estate as she would have taken if the lot had remained in their
hands; and, therefore, in assigning th dower, although it will be
assigned only out of the remaining rer.1 estate, yet in estimating her
share of that, the whole real estate, including the lot sold, will be
considered.
II. It now remains to consider briefly the claim of the complainants to relief beyond the allowance of. dower to the widow. The
prayer is that the trust deed be declared wholly void; so that the
real estate may descend under the intestate law and the personal
estate be distributed, precisely as if no deed had been executed.
This relief the court cannot decree.
A court of equity will not interfere to set aside a voluntary conveyance, because the conveyance disappoints hopes or expectations,
however just and reasonable; not even because it violates obligations, if they are only natural or moral ones. Courts of equity as
well as of law protect only legal rights and enforce legal obligations;
legal, I mean, as distinguished from such as are merely natural or
moral. For example, a promise, however solemnly made and binding in morals, if without a consideration, is not enforced in equity
any more than at law; nor is the obligation of a parent to provide
for children after his death. So, a conveyance will be set aside on
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the ground of fraud, only when it is in fraud of some legal right
and one existing at tie time it is made. Now, in this case we
may waive the iact that as to the infant complainant he was not

in ess,' at the execution of the trust deed. It is a consideration
decisive of the whole of this branch of the case, that even had
William Chandler not conveyed his estate his marriage would have
vested no rights in it nor have restricted his absolute control of
it beyond the wit's dower in the real estate. lie could aftermarriage have effectually disposed of his whole personal estate and of
the inheritance of his real estate by just such a trust deed as this.
It follows that his control of the property could not be less absolute b.fo'e the marriage than after it; for, otherwise, an engagement to marry would be of more force than marriage itself. Besides, as any disposal of property before marriage which he could
as freely have made after marriage defeated no right, but removed
only a bare chance that the complainants might succeed to it if
Chandler should continue to hold it and die intestate, the loss of
such a chance cannot be treated as the disappointment of h just andreasonable expectation in marriage, nor as so altering the circumstances of the husband as to have influenced the decision of the
intended wife. Again, it is clear that this deed would have stood
against any attempt by Chandler to dispose of the personal estate
and the inheritance of the real estate by another deed or by will.
That lie made no such attempt, but died intestate, so that, as it happened, these complainants would have succeeded to the whole property but for this deed, cannot affect the deed., A conveyance can
be set aside only for causes affecting it when it is made, as for
fraud then committed, or for the protection of rights then existing;
its validity cannot be held in suspense, to be determined by future
contingencies. This would subject titles to a distressing uncertainty.
But it was argued for the complainants that the deed being fraudulent in respect to dower is therefore wholly void, passing no title
whiatever, so that the heir at law may succeed to the real estate and
the distributees to the personal estate as a consequence of the fraud
on the right of dower, tiough they themselves might have no
equity to set the deed aside. Such would be the effect if the deed
were illegal; as where it violates the provisions of a statute which
avoids the deed itself; it is then a nullity and stands in the way of
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no claim which otherwise would be valid. And so, where a conveyance is tainted with fraud in fact, in which the parties claiming
under it are implicated, such a conveyance is wholly void; for no
effect whatever can be given to an instrument actually fraudulent ;
and, therefore, it is that, although a conveyance which is merely
voluntary and not -fraudulent in fact is invalid only against existing
creditors and not against subsequent creditors, yet if the conveyance
is tainted with actual fraud it is void altogether and subsequent
creditors are let in. But such is' not the effect of constructive
fraud. The object of the doctrine of constructive fraud is to protect
some right or interest, which in equity ought to be preserved,
against the effect of a conveyance which is in other respects valid;
and, therefore, equity does not avoid the deed altogether, but saves
against it the rights or interests which are to be protected. A deed
containing some provisions or having some operation forbidden by
statute or public policy, or contrary, as in this case, to some equity,
is held invalid only so far as the statute or policy or equity requires,
upon the principle ut res magis valeat quani pereat: Bredin's
Case, 1 Rep. 76; Shep. Touch. 68; Doe v. Pitcher,6 Taunt. 359;
Darlingv. Bogers, 22 Wend. 483. Thus a voluntary conveyance,
if not fraudulent in fact, passes the title to the grantee, but subject
to the rights of existing creditors, which -are preserved by raising
an implied trust in the grantee. See 1 Story Eq. Jur., sect. 871.
So in this case the trust deed is effectual between the parties, hut
equity preserves the right of dower against the real estate in the
hands of the grantees ; precisely as at law dower follows real estate
conveyed by the husband after the marriage, though the conveyance
is otherwise good. It does not seem accurate to say that a deed is
void for constructive fraud. The deed is valid; title under it
passes, but subject in equity to those rights which are affected by
the fraud.
Decree for complainant, Mrs. Chandler, in accordance with the
foregoing opinion.
NoTE.-Since the above case was decided, the same principle has been adjudged
by VAN VORaT, J., in the Supreme Court of New York, in February 1875, in

Youngs v. Carter 6- Youngs. and affirmed on appeal. The decision was that " a
conveyance of property made by a husband before marriage, for no consideration
other than that of filial affection, is fraudulent as against the inchoate right of
dower of his wife, and is, therefore, void so far as such right is concerned."

